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[I]f matters arise in our laws which concern other sciences and faculties, 
we commonly call for the aid o f that science or faculty which it concerns, 
which is an honourable and commendable thing. For thereby it appears 
that we do not despise all other sciences but our own, but we approve o f  
them and encourage them. . .1
INTRODUCTION
We live in an age dominated by science and technology. The question I want to 
address is whether the courts are doing a proper job of resolving disputes where an 
appreciation of such technical matters is necessary. The litigation of scientific and 
technological issues -  symbolized perhaps by the mouse in the courtroom, whether it 
be the Harvard Mouse2 or the Stuart Little mouse, a rodent with human brain cells,3 
or even worse, the mysterious Schroedinger’s cat which can be shown by physicists 
to be simultaneously alive and dead4 -  is a prospect that leaves much of the legal 
community justifiably shaking in its Luddite boots. But however daunting, the task 
of making courts more science friendly is important to sustaining the legitimacy of 
courts as dispute resolution institutions.
Science disputes are hitting the courts at an increasing velocity. In cases 
involving tort, environmental, intellectual property and criminal law, the admission 
and use of expert scientific or technical testimony is often crucial to the outcome. 
These cases frequently raise policy concerns that collide. For example, there have
* of the Supreme Court of Canada. The article is based on the 28th Annual Viscount Bennett Memorial 
Lecture, delivered at the University of New Brunswick Law School on 5 October 2006. My thanks to 
my law clerks, Emilie Taman and Maia Tsurumi for their indefatigable research into these issues.
1 Buckley v. Rice Thomas (1554), 1 PI. Com. 118, 75 E.R. 182 at 184, Saunders J. [Buckley].
2 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner o f Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45.
3 The London Times reported on 2 September 2006 that scientists at Stanford University in California 
are introducing human brain cells into mice. Stuart Little you will recall is the mouse that can talk and 
had human parents, but was still a mouse and the Times' headline read “A human brain trapped inside 
a mouse’s body -  not a good idea”. A Stanford law professor, responsible for overseeing the legal and 
ethical aspects of the Stuart Little experiment, was quoted as saying “Frankly, if  we made a mouse that 
had a fully human brain, I would be concerned”. When you have fully human children suing their 
parents in the United States for wrongfully bringing them into the world, I suspect Stuart Little might 
have a winner of a lawsuit.
4 Schroedinger’s cat is a creature that inhabits the wonderland of quantum physics. You and I may think 
that a physical object has one state. The book is either open or it is closed. You may be surprised to 
hear that quantum physicists do not agree and can prove by the principle of “super position” that a 
physical object can be both -  at least at the molecular level.
been very interesting disputes dealing with customized bacteria used to fight oil 
spills and other pollution, where scientists have designed a bacterium that has no 
counterpart in nature. But of course, once the pollution is eaten up, the bacteria keep 
on reproducing. If a court does not understand exactly what was modified and what 
the consequences of unleashing such organisms into the environment are, how can a 
court determine legal questions related to liability and remedies? From a scientific 
standpoint, one of the solutions to the problem of natural reproduction is to build into 
the organisms a so-called “suicide gene” so that at a certain point, the bacteria simply 
die. That sounds like a good idea, but then Monsanto came along with a genetically- 
modified soy bean containing a suicide gene and critics said, “This is contrary to the 
Competition Act because you’re forcing the farmer to go back to Monsanto every 
year to buy seed”.5
Recently, a group of scientists visited the Supreme Court of Canada. They told 
us that nanotechnology6 will create the next big wave of litigation. Harnessing so- 
called quantum nanotechnology, governments will be able to make devices to listen 
to private communications, however cleverly encrypted, and the legitimate parties to 
the communication will not be able to tell whether their communication has been 
intercepted or not. Other nanoscientists are working on a customized molecule to 
dust the site of brain surgery. It seems the dust will prevent scar tissue from forming 
and thus allow the tissue to knit. But what if the dust has disastrous unexpected side- 
effects? There are also applications of nanotechnology to deliver medicines to the 
right place in the body. But what is the legal liability if the delivery fails or runs 
amok and the patient is injured or dies? It is important that parties injured by such 
scientific initiatives, as well as those defending against the claims, have confidence 
in a court’s ability to understand and evaluate the expert evidence.
Lawyers and Scientists Seem to Inhabit Different Universes
Superficially, and misleadingly, the cultures of the lawyer and the scientist seem to 
have much in common.7 We all try to act on “evidence” and use comparable indicia 
of expertise and testing in the search for reliability. Conclusions are drawn from the 
accumulated evidence through logic, deduction and induction. Yet in truth, we 
largely inhabit mutually skeptical solitudes, and where these solitudes rub together 
the result is often not pleasurable for either discipline, especially for the judge. For 
instance, the idea of “evidence” seems to mean something quite different to scientists 
than to judges. In science, “evidence” is not equivalent to “proof’.8 For the most
5 See Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902.
6 A nanometer is a billionth of a meter. A sheet of paper is about 100,000 nanometers thick. Using 
various new techniques, in particular something called a scanning tunnelling microscope, scientists can 
construct new forms of matter at an atomic level.
7 See generally Alan D. Gold, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law: The Scientific Approach (Toronto: 
Irwin Law Inc., 2003).
8 Federal Judicial Center Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 2nd ed., 2000 at 80, online: The 
Federal Judicial Center <http://www.gc.gov/public/home.nsf/pages/610> [Reference Manual on 
Scientific Evidence].
part, theories cannot truly be “proved” in the sense that they become indisputable. 
Almost all scientific conclusions are considered provisional.9 Theories can be 
supported by more or less evidence and may eventually come to be accepted as the 
dominant or most likely explanation of observed phenomena. The phrase “consistent 
with” to a scientist merely means that something cannot be excluded as an 
explanation. It does not connote any particular weight, association or commonality. 
However, to judges, lawyers, and the public this phrase is often interpreted to mean 
that there is a “match”.10
The average judge is likely to have little background in science generally; much 
less particular expertise in the field to which the dispute relates. Even worse, while 
the lawyers have had months and perhaps years of preparation, the judge hits a 
dispute cold and is expected to get “up to speed” within a few of days on matters 
which the expert witnesses have spent a professional lifetime attempting to 
understand. The predicament of the judge was well summarized by Justice Frank 
Muldoon, a larger-than-life figure, who sat for years as one of the leading judges in 
the Federal Court, Trial Division. The topic was a patent dispute involving the 
dryer-added clothes fabric conditioner called BOUNCE. Unilever had claimed that 
the coating (animal fat and sugar extract) on the substrate of Procter & Gamble’s 
dryer sheet violated a Unilever patent. Legions of experts were called by both sides 
to argue about how this animal fat mixture distributed itself on clothing during the 
dryer cycle. Millions of dollars hung in the balance. After a lengthy trial in which 
there were periodic outbursts from Muldoon J. complaining that all this talk of 
surfactants, contact angles, and surface tension was incomprehensible, he eventually 
exploded in his final reasons for judgment as follows:
A judge unschooled in the arcane subject is at difficulty to know which of 
the disparate, solemnly-mouthed and hotly contended scientific verities is, 
or are, plausible. Is the eminent scientist expert with the shifty eyes and 
poor demeanour the one whose “scientific verities” are not credible? 
Cross-examination is said to be the great engine for getting at the truth, but 
when the unschooled judge cannot perceive the truth, if he or she ever 
hears it, among all the chemical and other scientific baffle-gab, is it not a 
solemn exercise in silliness?11
As counsel for Unilever, I took little comfort in this cri de coeur (although Unilever 
won the case), but the fact of the matter is that judges and jurors may have no means 
of assessing credibility except through the usual clues applicable to witnesses 
generally. Even body language and physical appearance, as Muldoon J. observed,
9 Justice Thomas Cromwell & Ronald-Frans Melchers, “Testing the Validity of Scientific Evidence” 
(National Judicial Institute Conference, Managing Science in the Courtroom, Toronto, 23 November 
2005) [unpublished].
10 Gold, supra note 7 at 200.
11 Unilever PLC v. Procter & Gamble Inc. (1993), 47 C.P.R. (3d) 479 at 488.
may well be misleading when it comes to expert witnesses.12 In the absence of 
anything better, the court may be overly impressed with credentials and reputation, 
and too little focussed on the validity and content of the scientific testimony itself, 
which may have been presented in a disjointed and confusing manner.
In a criminal case, the Manitoba Court of Appeal criticised the way in which a 
scientific point was argued for just this reason:
It can be seen that Crown counsel was inviting the jury to determine a 
question of science on the basis of their impression of the demeanour of 
the witnesses.13
Yet the same flaw appears frequently in judge-alone cases. In Lubrizol Corp. v. 
Imperial Oil Ltd.,14 a patent case involving heavy molecular weight dispersants in 
motor oils, the evaluation of the expert witnesses by the trial judge includes the 
following:
Each witness, especially the expert witnesses, received very careful 
scrutiny by myself with attention paid not only to their answers, but also to 
their demeanour, out-of-line advocacy, evasiveness.15
My note on that day reads: “Dr. Klaus would be a better witness if he 
showed more confidence in counsel who are experienced and 
competent.”16
After hearing Billmeyer’s evidence in reply, I had written as one of my 
comments: “Impressive, straightforward, very convinced that he’s right in 
his observations and conclusions.”17
What is the scientific community to think about the administration of justice if 
experts are to be judged like travelling salesmen on the basis of their ability to 
project confidence and conviction? One hesitates even to ask. Here are a few 
representative complaints from some experts who felt “burned” by their trial 
experience:
1. “There is no opportunity to explain evidence or interpretation oneself, no 
assurance that counsel will explain it clearly or in a sophisticated fashion, 
and no opportunity to correct errors or crudities which creep in.”
12 See also Sanja K. Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, “Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the 
Messenger and the Message” (2003) 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 441.
13 R. v. Medvedew (1978), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 434 at 440 (Man. C.A.).
14 Lubrizol Corp. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (1991), 33 C.P.R. (3d) 1. While I was not involved in the trial, I 
disclose that I was one of the lawyers who appeared for Imperial Oil on the appeal(s).
15 Ibid. at 37 per Cullen J.
16 Ibid. at 41.
17 Ibid. at 42.
2. “There is no guarantee that counsel will even understand the arguments the 
expert has made, and consequently no guarantee that questions which may 
be posed by the judges will be correctly or clearly answered.”
3. “The expert witness is almost entirely at the mercy of counsel on both 
sides. The expert must depend on counsel to present his or her views fairly 
and forcefully....[scientists] do not get an opportunity to defend themselves 
against misquotation or selective quotation by opposing counsel.” 18
A common thread woven through these complaints is the impression (perhaps false) 
among some scientific experts that the legal system suffers from amateurishness 
when it deals with scientific matters. Our courts are said not to be scientific enough 
in their approach to scientific evidence. Legal academics, too, sometimes offer 
observations surprising enough to make scientists rub their eyes, as in the case of 
Stéphane Beaulac and Pierre-André Côté, professors of law at the Université de 
Montréal, who recently wrote with a somewhat shaky grip of the law of gravity:
Consider a flight from Montreal to London. The pilot must plan such a 
flight based on a conception of the earth that is round, otherwise the 
aircraft would end up in outer space.19
From a scientist’s point of view, a disturbing feature of litigation is the 
adversarial process itself, under which judges and lawyers assume that the truth is 
best arrived at by contending parties stating their own (one-sided) point of view as 
simply, forcefully and with the least amount of nuance possible. Rather than acting 
as an independent scientific investigator, the judge sits and listens to both adversaries 
and is supposed to distill from all the conflicting (and perhaps overstated) evidence 
the “true facts” to which he or she then applies the law. This is the jurist’s equivalent 
of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” in the Wealth of Nations.20 If every litigant 
furiously pursues their own self-interest in the courtroom then, at the end of the day, 
the truth will emerge. Many scientists think that this approach is naive and is hardly 
likely to get to the truth in a matter involving serious learning and sophistication.
Another problem is that, as scientists see it, courts rush in where experts fear to 
tread. How can a court possibly resolve a products liability case involving the 
alleged adverse effects of using oral contraceptives,21 for example, when the experts 
themselves are divided over the increased risk of strokes? In a class action in the 
United Kingdom brought by a group of women in Britain against Schering
18 J. Morgan Kousser, “Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship and 
Expert Witnessing” (1984) 6:1 The Public Historian 5.
19 Stéphane Beaulac & Pierre-André Côté, “Driedger’s ‘Modem Principle’ at the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006) 40 R.J.T. 131 at 168.
20 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (London: 1776).
21 See e.g. Buchan v. Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 92 (C.A.), a ff g (1984),
46 O.R. (2d) 113(H.C.J.).
Pharmaceutical and others,22 six studies on this relationship were put before the 
court.23 Three of these studies, all published in the British medical journal, The 
Lancet, said that there was an approximate doubling of the risk to a woman who was 
taking the third generation of this pill.24 There were also three industry-sponsored 
reports which said that there was no increase in the risk. The studies, written largely 
in algebra, landed before the unfortunate Mr. Justice Mackay. He accepted as 
persuasive the industry reports, dismissed the action, and was then virtually 
universally condemned in the medical literature. An editorial in The Lancet, stated 
that “trying science in a court of law is doomed to failure”.25 The editorial went on 
to say, “[djespite millions of pounds spent, and numerous intelligent minds locked in 
combat, the judge failed utterly to get to the heart of the matter”.
There is a further problem. The judge may not have the luxury of waiting until 
scientists in the relevant field have reached a consensus. The court is a dispute 
resolution forum, not a free-wheeling scientific inquiry, and the judge must reach a 
timely decision based on the information available. Even if science has not figured it 
out yet, the law cannot wait. This problem was in the forefront of the late Justice 
Sam Grange’s mind when he was faced with reaching conclusions in his 
Commission of Inquiry into deaths at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto. He 
wrote:
I cannot await the research. I am charged to find the cause of death of 
thirty-six children. Obviously toxicologic information is important. I 
must accept the best information available at least if it is not seriously 
challenged in the present state of science. I may eventually be proven 
wrong because the toxicologic evidence upon which I in part based my 
conclusion may be proved wrong or inadequate [but] that is how I 
interpret obedience to my mandate.26
It is Easier for Lawyers to Attack the Testifier than the Testimony
Even if knowledgeable about the specific scientific issues in a case, lawyers, being 
practical people, are sensitive to the dangers of overloading the finders of fact, 
whether judge or jurors, with too much jargon and complexity, scientific or 
otherwise. The skilful cross-examiner may have soaked up the elements of the 
science at issue in a particular case, but will often find it easier and more effective to
22 XYZ & Others v. Schering Health Care Ltd., Organon Laboratories Ltd., John Wyeth & Brother 
Limited, [2002] EWHC 1420 (Q.B.).
23 See Editorial, “Epidemiology on trial” (2002) 360 The Lancet 421; News, “Third Generation Pill Not 
More Risky” (2002) 269 The Pharmaceutical Journal 149.
24 Haroon Ashraf, “UK high court dismisses risk of VTE in ‘pill’ test case” (2002) 360 The Lancet 391.
25 Editorial, supra note 23.
26 Ontario, Report o f  the Royal Commission o f  Inquiry Into Certain Deaths a t the Hospital fo r Sick 
Children and Related Matters (Toronto: Royal Commission, 1984) at 29-30.
discredit the expert witness than to demolish the scientific basis on which the 
witness’s testimony rests.
A good example is the cross-examination of a scientific expert conducted by 
one of Canada’s great criminal lawyers, G. Arthur Martin, in the celebrated Stephen 
Truscott murder case when it was “retried” before the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1966.27 The accused was a teenager; the victim, a girl named Lynn Harper, who was 
of about the same age, and was last seen alive in Truscott’s presence. One o f the 
strongest arguments for the defence was that Truscott could not have murdered Lynn 
Harper in the narrow window of opportunity contemplated by the prosecution. The 
evidence was that Lynn had eaten her supper at a quarter to six the night she was 
killed. Steven Truscott had a strong alibi from 8:00 p.m. onwards. The Crown 
therefore had to establish that Lynn was murdered within two hours of her last meal, 
and for that purpose called a pathologist to testify that the precise time of death could 
be established from the state of digestion of the contents of her stomach. Arthur 
Martin’s task was to undermine the testimony of the pathologist. He did so using a 
dry sense of humour rather than by debating the correctness of the pathologist’s 
science. Here is an extract from the trial transcript:
Q. Now, you have written extensively, Dr. Simpson, in the field of 
forensic medicine.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I have read a good many of your books and one of the books 
you have written is entitled Forensic Medicine and, as my learned 
friend Mr. Scott says, it has gone through five editions now?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the last edition, indeed, you say this edition has been combed 
to insure it is abreast of the times. I notice at page 7 of the book - of 
course, I quite realize here you are dealing with a post-mortem event 
- you say under the heading of “Cooling”:
“This is the only real guide to the lapse of time during the first 
eighteen hours after death, and its early measurement is often vital to 
the establishment of an approximate time of death.”
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you, anywhere in this book, suggest that the stomach contents 
and the state to which digestion has proceeded following the last 
meal is a reliable guide to the time of death?
A. No sir: I think that that is, as may be evident to you, a short book for 
the student.
27 R. v. Truscott, [1967] S.C.R. 309.
Q. It would not have made it much bigger to put in a sentence 
indicating that stomach contents were also a reliable guide?
A. No sir: I appreciate that, but it is not intended to be a comprehensive 
work, of course.
Q. It should contain the things upon which there is greater consensus -
A. I think you may expect the next edition, sir, to contain some 
reference.
Q. You are going to change the next edition?
A. I think it is how one improves one’s textbooks, by experience.
Q. When did you decide to change the next edition?
A. Each time I am writing I am learning and each case I have helps me 
to improve the next edition.
Q. I will throw this away and buy the next edition...28
The striking feature of the cross-examination is that it essentially ignored the merits 
of what the pathologist was trying to say. Counsel declined to take the witness (and 
the court) into the underlying science. The trier of fact was no doubt struck by the 
inconsistency between what the pathologist had written in his book and what he was 
now ready to swear to, but would have been none the wiser as to which version was
29correct.
Arthur Martin’s possible distrust of a non-expert court to appreciate the 
underlying science may have been wise, although in the end the conviction of his 
client was affirmed.
Does the Trial Process Work Effectively Where Science is Involved?
In some cases, it is clear that the scientific issues have not been properly understood. 
Take as an example the 7,000 lawsuits pending against Merck in respect of its drug 
Vioxx. In the first of those lawsuits to go to trial, Merck was found liable by a jury 
to pay U.S. $253 million to a single claimant. Merck said the deceased did not at all 
fit the Vioxx risk profile because he had taken Vioxx for only a few weeks before his 
fatal heart attack, whereas Merck’s scientific evidence suggested a danger threshold 
of about 18 months.30 Merck brought experts to court in an effort to show that there 
was no reputable scientific basis to the plaintiffs claim. Not only was Merck’s
28 Reproduced in Arthur Maloney, “Expert Evidence” in Special Lectures o f the Law Society o f  Upper 
Canada, Defending a Criminal Case (Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1969).
29 Interestingly, in the August 2006 inquiry into the case, referred to the Ontario Court of Appeal by the 
Federal Justice Minister, experts were called who said that it was simply impossible to judge by the 
state of digestion, the time from ingestion to death: Tracy Tyler, “Noted pathologist slams ‘ludicrous’ 
methodology” The Toronto Star (8 July 2006) A 15.
30 Ann Woolner, “A thin case against Vioxx” Ottawa Citizen (27 August 2005) B7.
evidence not accepted, but the following was reported from a post-trial press 
conference held by the jurors:
Whenever Merck was up there it was like “wah wah wah”, juror John 
Ostrom told reporters, “we didn’t know what the heck they were talking 
about”.31
Whether or not Merck’s case was valid, such an outcome is wholly unsatisfactory. 
In some measure this may be the fault of the trial process which, some critics argue, 
includes the following weaknesses:
(a) the non-sequential presentation of evidence, which can be confusing, e.g. 
skipping from issue to issue or back and forth between fact witnesses and 
expert opinion witnesses;
(b) evidence which is selected and arranged by parties in a way that may be 
self-serving, but potentially misleading unless effectively countered;32
(c) counsel who may not have sufficient background and familiarity with a 
particular scientific area to cross-examine the opposing party’s experts 
effectively;33
(d) “professional” hired-gun, incompetent or ideological witnesses who may 
deflect the debate from the real issues;
(e) cross-examination which can undermine trustworthy sources for reasons 
other than scientific validity, yet fail to discredit opposing testimony of 
less merit that is delivered with greater presentational skill; and
(f) some evidence which may be important from a scientific perspective may 
be excluded because of admissibility rulings, while other weak or 
controversial evidence may be admitted, depending on how the judge 
exercises the gatekeeper role.
The result of these weaknesses? Wah wah wah.
31 Ibid.
32 In R. v. F.(D.S.) (1999), 23 C.R. (5th) 37 (Ont. C.A.) the Court declined to set aside the conviction 
because, in part, at trial it was open to the defence to challenge the expert’s general statements about 
the empirical or scientific support for her opinions and it failed to do so. In R. v. Blanchard, [1996] 
N.J. No. 319 at para. 6 (Nfld. C.A.) (QL), the Newfoundland Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal, 
stating that “in light of [the expert’s] education, experience, research and extensive history in analysis 
of animals, which includes 160 appearances before courts in Ontario, the Maritimes and 
Newfoundland, it is difficult to see how the trial judge could do otherwise than admit the evidence in 
the absence of testimony on a voir dire supporting the contention of the defence that no such field of 
expertise exists.”
33 In R. v. D.D., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 at 300, the Court stated that “[E]xpert evidence is highly resistant to 
effective cross-examination by counsel who are not experts in that field. In cases where there is no 
competing expert evidence, this will have the effect of depriving the jury of an effective framework 
within which to evaluate the merit o f the evidence.”
A Revised Approach to the Admission of Science and Technology Evidence
Historically, the common law courts judged science by seeking to ascertain the 
prevailing consensus (if any) in the scientific community.34 This came under 
criticism as the velocity of scientific advances accelerated. The courts were 
frequently faced with “novel science”35 where there was no opportunity for 
consensus to form about its validity or invalidity.
The consensus approach was rejected in the United States in 1993 in the 
Daubert case, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that legal admissibility should 
henceforth be based on scientific validity not scientific consensus, writing that “[i]n a 
case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon 
scientific validity.”36 The real issue is not what the experts say, how qualified they 
are to say it, or whether a consensus has formed in the relevant scientific community, 
but whether the experts have established in their evidence a scientific basis for their 
testimony. The judge should take a more active gatekeeper role, perhaps reflecting a 
lingering mistrust of juries who, under the Daubert approach, would never get to 
hear the evidence if the judge slammed shut the metaphorical gate.
The present position is this: scientific opinion, to be admissible before the jury 
(or the judge sitting alone), must be (i) necessary -  i.e. not within the usual 
understanding of non-experts; (ii) valid -  the science measures what it is supposed to 
measure; and (iii) reliable -  the result is reproducible. The presumption is that to be 
scientific, a statement must be testable; that is, susceptible to evidence that could 
potentially show it to be false (if it is indeed false).37 As a result, post-Daubert, the 
courts have found it harder to evaluate the validity of the science than pre-Daubert 
when all they had to determine was whether a consensus did or did not exist.38 The
34 Under the consensus approach, the scientific principle on which the evidence is based must be 
“sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”: 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 at 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) [Frye}.
35 By “novel science” is meant “science at the frontiers of knowledge” where “theories are vulnerable” 
versus “textbook science” which is known with “great confidence”; see David Goodstein, “How 
Science Works” in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra note 8 at 79. The line between 
novelty and general acceptance is fuzzy - referred to in Frye, ibid. as the “twilight zone between the 
experimental and the demonstrable”.
36 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 at n. 9 (1993) [emphasis in original] 
[Daubert],
37 See Susan Haack, “Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science” (2005) 95:S1 
American Journal o f  Public Health S66, reproduced in (2006) 41 The International Society o f  
Barristers Quarterly 376 at 378.
38 At least one commentator says that Daubert “has produced a minefield clogged with ‘Daubert 
hearings’ that are more lengthy, technical, and diffuse than anything that preceded them”. See David 
Crump, “The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Philosophy of 
Science” (2003) 68 Mo. L. Rev. 1.
Daubert approach requires a level of scientific sophistication on the part of the judge 
that the earlier consensus approach did not.39
The Daubert test has gained acceptance in Canada, particularly when screening 
novel science, which is subjected to “special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a 
basic threshold of reliability”.40 In R. v. J.-L.J.,41 a prosecution for sexual abuse of 
children, the defence called an expert to testify that the accused had no disposition 
towards pedophilia. The Supreme Court of Canada explicitly accepted the four 
Daubert factors as “ones that could be helpful in evaluating the soundness of novel 
science”. These are:
(1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested:
Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and 
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is 
what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.
(2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 
publication:
[Submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a 
component of “good science”, in part because it increases the 
likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.
(3) the known or potential rate of error or the existence of standards; and
(4) whether the theory or technique used has been generally accepted:
A “reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, 
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an 
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that 
community.”
39 An expertise modestly disclaimed by some U.S. lower court judges, including the lower court judges 
in Daubert itself;when the case was returned to the courts in California, Kozinski J. observed:
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court’s opinion, is 
to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters 
squarely within their expertise, in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to 
what is and what is not “good science”, and occasionally to reject such expert 
testimony because it was not “derived by the scientific method”. Mindful of our 
position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed 
with this heady task.
See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit following remand of Daubert by the Supreme Court: 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311 at 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
40 R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 at 25.
41 R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 [J.-LJ .].
Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular 
evidence admissible, and “a known technique which has been able to 
attract only minimal support within the community,” ...may properly 
be viewed with skepticism.42
Rehnquist C.J., dissenting in Daubert, expressed skepticism about the new test. 
He thought it unlikely that the quality of a scientific proposition could ever be 
properly evaluated by a court that lacks the necessary background knowledge and 
expertise. In later cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has somewhat refined its 
approach.43
Testing for “Junk Science”
The courts have responded with varying degrees of enthusiasm to this new role, as 
have the experts, some of whom obviously believe that giving the judges too much 
disclosure about the methodology risks confusion. In J.-L.J. itself, for example, the 
accused was exposed to various suggestive photographs while his penis was attached 
to an instrument called a penile plethysmograph. His penile response was measured. 
Lack of any measurable response was equated with repugnance to sex with small 
boys. The legal question was whether this sort of test could be remotely helpful to 
the court in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The expert declined 
to share his data with the trial court. Here is the somewhat offensive explanation he 
provided:
Listen, Your Honour, we have to understand that if we start -  normally we 
do not submit the psychological tests in detail or the curves because at that 
point if we start calculating everything in centimetres or millimetres, we 
will be here all morning. Let’s just say that this curve, properly analysed, 
demonstrates the following results, that there are no, according to how 
those curves are normally evaluated, there are no signs of deviant 
behaviour in him.44
Elsewhere, the expert explained why he had not produced for the court the data on 
which he based his opinion:
Okay. But it is not normally produced because otherwise, it would be too 
complicated to produce all the details, there would be battles over the little 
details.45
42 Ibid. at para. 33.
43 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999).
44 J.-L.J., supra note 41 at para. 57.
45 Ibid. As pointed out in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, supra note 43 at 146, “...conclusions and 
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. ,..[N]othing in...Daubert...requires the...court 
to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A 
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion...”
The Quebec Court of Appeal had ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge 
ought to have admitted the evidence and left its weight to be assessed by the jury. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal decision and upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling that the evidence was simply inadmissible because it had not been 
shown to be either relevant or reliable.46 Penile plethysmography is a technique that 
is said to have some utility in measuring the success of treatment of known 
pedophiles, but has no track record in diagnosing pedophilia in the case of an 
individual who categorically denies any such orientation. In other words, the expert 
had overstepped the boundary of his admitted expertise.
In other cases, both the experts and the judge have taken each other seriously, 
as in the recent re-run of the 1925 Scopes “monkey trial” in Pennsylvania.47 The 
parents of some school children challenged their local school board’s directive to 
include “intelligent design” in the curriculum of a high school biology class as an 
alternative to Darwin’s theory of evolution. The school board was overruled by the 
Court on the basis that the theory of intelligent design “is grounded in theology not 
science” and has no place in a biology class. Intelligent design was found to be 
lacking in testability.
Honourable mention might also be made of the bizarre U.S. case of Iowa v. 
Harrington*8 where the trial court was asked to admit novel scientific evidence of 
alleged brain fingerprinting. According to the Globe & Mail:
For two decades, Terry Harrington protested his innocence from his Iowa 
prison cell, insisting that he had not shot and killed a retired police officer 
when he was 17 years old. Then he decided to try brain fingerprinting.
It’s a computerized mind-reading technique developed by Jerry Farwell, 
an American researcher and entrepreneur who says he can tell if the details 
of a crime scene are stored in a suspect’s brain. If Mr. Harrington were 
innocent, the test would show that his brain did not recognize details about 
the murder, details the killer would know. “The brain never lies,” Dr.
Farwell says.
In February 2003, a judge in Iowa accepted the results of the brain- 
fingerprinting test, the new testimony from a key prosecution witness and 
the suppressed police reports. The Iowa Supreme Court overturned his 
conviction, and ordered a new trial. By then, he had been in prison for 25 
years. He was released on bail. In October, 2003, the charges were 
officially dropped. Mr. Harrington, is suing the police.49
46 The top four problems identified by U.S. Federal Judges: experts abandon objectivity; excessive 
expense; questionable validity or reliability; and conflict among experts that defies reasoned 
assessment. See Carol Krafka et al., “Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices and Concerns 
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials” (2002) 8 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 309.
47 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
48 Iowa v. Harrington, 659 N.W. 2d 509 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 2003).
49 Anne Mcllroy, “Not guilty: ‘the brain never lies’” Globe & Mail (5 November 2005) F6.
The idea of brain fingerprinting has some intuitive attraction as a technique to record 
an involuntary response, much as a lie detector is supposed to do, but there is 
considerable doubt as to whether, at this stage of its development, the technique 
achieves what it is claimed to do, and whether its results are reproducible.
Difficulties with the Gatekeeper Function
It must be admitted that many courts are continuing to have serious difficulties in 
digesting and evaluating scientific evidence, even rather crude scientific evidence. 
This is for both institutional and procedural reasons.50 Institutionally, judges hesitate 
to exclude such evidence in a jury case for fear of usurping the fact finding function 
of the jury. Procedurally, in a judge alone case, there is always a temptation to let 
the evidence in, fully understood or not, and for the judge to leave it to the end of the 
trial to determine what weight, if any, it is to be given. Either way, the result can be 
an enormous waste of time and money and, in some cases, a miscarriage of justice.
In 2005, for example, the media were full of reports of another wrongful 
conviction based on identification of an accused as a murderer by the novel science 
of barefoot morphology.51 Mr. Dimitre Dimitrov, a Bulgarian immigrant living in 
Ottawa, had been convicted four years earlier of murdering his landlord, who was 
also Bulgarian, by beating him to death with a blunt instrument. There was some 
evidence of mutual hostility, but there was nothing to tie Dimitrov to the murder 
except, according to the prosecution, a pair of boots that were covered with stains of 
blood which the Crown alleged belonged to the victim. There were no eye 
witnesses. The onus was on the prosecution to connect the boots to the accused. 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Sergeant Robert Kennedy testified that the 
impressions people’s feet leave on the insoles of footwear are quite distinct and that
50 See e.g. Sidney N. Lederman, “Judges as Gatekeepers: The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Based 
on Novel Theories” in Joost Blom & Hélène Dumont, eds., Science, Truth and Justice -  Canadian 
Institute fo r the Administration o f Justice (Montréal: Les Éditions Thémis, 2000) 217. Justice 
Lederman suggests that Canadian courts should adopt American-style “Daubert hearings” that would 
require experts to file comprehensive reports and that would permit discovery of the experts. The 
application of the Mohan criteria already requires a voir dire which can become quite lengthy in some 
cases. Ideally, a Mohan hearing should be done before the trial is underway to give a judge more time 
to rule on the admissibility of the preferred testimony. This would also assist counsel, who would 
know in advance whether their expert will be allowed to testify. Pre-trial discoveries or hearings 
would require advance disclosure by counsel, including disclosure of the methodology on which the 
expert anchors his or her conclusions.
51 R. v. Dimitrov (2003), 68 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.) [Dimitrov],
by applying techniques of barefoot morphology he could say that Dimitrov was 
“likely” the usual wearer of the boots.52
Sgt. Kennedy is an expert in footprint identification. He could opine whether a 
running shoe imprint in the mud beside a body was consistent with the type of 
running shoe worn on the day in question by an accused. But here there was none of 
that; there was only a blood-stained boot. However, Sgt. Kennedy had also 
developed a sideline expertise trying to identify suspects by the imprint left by feet 
inside shoes or boots, specifically the pattern left by the weight-bearing portions of 
the bare foot on the insole.53 The main proponent of barefoot morphology in Canada 
and the U.S. is RCMP Sgt. Kennedy himself.
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded in 2003 that Sgt. Kennedy should have 
been stopped at “the gateway” by the trial judge.54 His evidence of “barefoot 
morphology” failed to meet any of the criteria set out in Daubert and R. v. 
there was no serious test of Sgt. Kennedy’s hypothesis, and as such there was no
52 “Barefoot morphology” theory is a “novel science” that forms part of an explosion of identification 
techniques. In People v. Davis, 304 Ill.App.3d 427 (1999), a man was convicted of first degree murder 
where the only evidence connecting him to the scene of the crime was a set of lip prints on a roll of 
duct tape found near by. A forensic specialist testified that the same procedures used in the 
comparison of fingerprints could apply to “lip prints” which, he said, are just as individualized as 
fingerprints. The man was convicted. His appeal was dismissed, notwithstanding the fact that the trial 
judge failed to even hold a “gatekeeper” hearing as required by Illinois law. The Illinois Court of 
Appeal concluded at 437-38 that:
the method they employed to identify the lip print was the same as the well- 
accepted method of fingerprint identification which is accepted as a means of 
identification by the forensic science community... . Consequently we find that the 
method employed to identify lip prints, a side-by-side comparison, is reliable.
The Court appeared to be satisfied by the fact that the expert who performed the analysis “[was] 
unaware of any dissent in the field regarding the methodology used to make a positive identification 
lip print.” Convincing? Similarly, in another case, a man was convicted on the basis of “ear print” 
identification although the conviction was overturned on appeal: State v. Kunze, 112 Wash. App. 1023 
(2002).
53 In Canada, evidence of “barefoot morphology” was accepted in R. v. Légère (1994), 156 N.B.R. (2d) 
321 (C.A.), but rejected in R. v. Sood, [1997] O.J. No. 5417 (Gen. Div.). Sgt. Kennedy has also 
testified in some American cases: State (South Carolina) v. Jones, 541 S.E.2d 813 at 818-19 (S.C. 
2001) and State (North Carolina) v. Berry, 546 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 2001).
54 Dimitrov, supra note 51. In setting aside Dimitrov’s original conviction, the court said the trial judge 
had not performed a proper gatekeeper role (at paras. 55-56):
In our view, the slight probative value of Sergeant Kennedy's evidence was 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The risk that the jury might be over-awed by 
Sergeant Kennedy's expertise was a real one in this case. The evidence occupied a 
day and was augmented by diagrams, a lengthy discussion of the study of barefoot 
analysis and technical language about anatomy and laboratory procedures.
In light of the significant issues as to reliability of the evidence, its lack of logical 
relevance and the risk o f distortion in the fact-finding process, the trial judge erred 
in principle in admitting Sergeant Kennedy's evidence.
opportunity for peer review and no error rate could be established. The Court 
therefore set aside Dimitrov’s original conviction on the basis that the trial judge had 
not performed a proper gatekeeper role. At the retrial in 2006, Dimitrov was readily 
acquitted.
What is to be Done?
There are many kinds of science, and courts may therefore have to develop different 
approaches to gate-keeping depending on the type of science or technology at 
issue.55 Some areas of claimed expertise are more easily validated and reproduced 
than others. DNA evidence methodologies, for example, lend themselves more 
easily to testing, critique and the generation of error rates than do theories in the 
softer sciences, such as psychology. Nonetheless, there are a number of ways to try 
to help non-scientists evaluate science to the extent necessary to resolve a particular 
dispute.
(A) Judicial Education
Much greater effort on both the general and particularized education of judges and 
lawyers is overdue. (This may not help jurors, but it is the judge who acts as the 
gatekeeper.) The National Judicial Institute has taken the lead to bring groups of 
Canadian judges together to explore scientific concepts and subjects that may give 
rise to litigation. On a more specialized level, the Einstein Institute for Science, 
Health & the Courts (EINSHAC), a Washington based non-governmental 
organization, has held many seminars forjudges in genetics and biotechnology.56 If 
nothing else, by attending at these seminars judges gain some familiarity with the 
jargon and methodology in a setting less stressful than that of a trial. Of course, 
judges would be better off still if their education had started at a younger age, but 
scientific legal education has traditionally been a matter largely neglected in our law 
schools. Recently, this shows signs of improvement.57 At Dalhousie, there is now a 
course on Law and Technology which covers genetic modifications in plant and 
animal materials for food and agriculture, developments in telecommunications, 
privacy concerns, access to information, ethics in technology, and so on. The
55 Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, “Demystifying the Law/Science Disconnect” (2001) 26 J. 
Health Pol. 429.
56 Some critics are concerned that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. Professor Susan Haack says 
she is:
.. .a little worried about the danger of giving judges the false impression that they are 
qualified to make subtle scientific determinations, when it is hardly realistic to expect 
that a few hours in a science seminar will transform judges into scientists competent 
to make subtle and sophisticated scientific judgments — any more than a few hours in 
a legal seminar could transform scientists into judges competent to make subtle and 
sophisticated legal determinations.
See supra note 37 at 388.
57 Surveyed 21 July 2006.
Université de Montréal has a course dealing specifically with “la preuve scientifique 
au soutien des recours civiles et pénaux”. These courses try to teach law students 
how to manage scientific proof. Other universities are also beginning to get their 
students into this area, and as well they should.58
(B) Judicial Recruitment
Traditionally, little effort has been made in Canada to recruit judges with a scientific 
or engineering background. This is true even of the Federal Court where most 
intellectual property litigation takes place.59 This lacuna should be addressed. In the 
Lubrizol v. Imperial Oil litigation mentioned earlier, the German Patent Court, which 
seems to be composed entirely of expert scientists, had invalidated Lubrizol’s 
Meinhardt patent, on which its case in Canada depended, as “obvious” in light of the 
prior science. The trial judge in our Federal Court disagreed. In an era where 
intellectual property is global, it is unfortunate to have inconsistent pronouncements 
of this sort. Where our judges differ from foreign courts on matters of science and 
technology, it is important that commercial litigants are satisfied that the courts in 
both jurisdictions, despite their differences, have understood and properly weighed 
the conflicting scientific perspectives.
(C) Modify the Adversarial System
Assuming that the judge does take his or her role as the evidential gatekeeper 
seriously, whether presiding with a jury or alone, the present trial system still has too 
many systemic problems that get in the way of the court truly understanding the 
underlying science and technology.60
58 For example, McGill University offers a course on medical liability, the University of Ottawa has a 
course on forensic science, Osgoode Hall has a medical/legal seminar that covers expert scientific 
witness testimony and basic medical information, the University of B.C. has a quantitative methods in 
law course, l’Université de Sherbrooke has a course on molecular biology and the law and the 
University of Windsor has a law and medicine class.
59 This seems to also be the case in the United States where a judge put it this way:
Judges, trial and appellate, generally are not recruited from within the ranks of 
behavioral research scientists. They tend to have little formal, post-secondary, 
science education...except as provided in continuing judicial education programs.
They tend to have no particular training in statistical analysis as it relates to 
scientific research. In short, they tend to be scientifically ignorant, which means 
they are not acquainted with, let alone conversant, with scientific practice or 
language.
See Gold, supra note 7 at 19 citing Alan G. Gless, “Some Post-Daubert Trial Tribulations of a Simple 
Country Judge: Behavioural Science in Trial Courts” (1995) 13 Behav. Sci. & L. 261 at 262-63.
60 In Alberta, the Rules o f Court Project is concerned with such procedural matters as efficiency and the 
cost of expert evidence, but some of the proposed reforms may have a secondary benefit of tempering 
some of the excesses of the adversary system by providing for court-appointed experts, referees or 
advisors. See Tania M. Bubela, “Expert Evidence: The Ethical Responsibility of the Legal Profession” 
(2004)41 Alta. L. Rev. 853.
In the first place, our present system contemplates that a case must be resolved 
on the evidence heard in the courtroom. Yet the courtroom, with all its formalities 
and evidentiary rules is a poor schoolhouse, and duelling experts may make bad 
teachers.61 Courts are, however, the masters of their own procedure and have the 
flexibility to modify to their own advantage the framework within which experts 
testify. Why, for example, in a case that requires a judge to grapple with serious 
scientific evidence, can the parties not arrange for an out-of-court seminar on basic 
science specific to the dispute? This was done for a panel of judges in the House of 
Lords in Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.,62 a patent case, where it 
was explained at paragraph 135 of the decision:
...the work which Professor Yudkin did by means of carefully prepared 
seminars enabled all those involved to concentrate on the issues of law in 
the appeal without having to spend a good deal of extra time in the course 
of the hearing on learning about the technology. This had the result of 
shortening the length of time that it was necessary to devote to the hearing 
by several days. It was at Lord Hoffman’s suggestion in the course of a 
preliminary hearing that this was done as there was no dispute about the 
technology. I suggest that it is a course which might usefully be adopted 
in the future in cases of this kind, where the technology is complex and 
undisputed and the parties are willing to consent to it.
As previously stated, the case of Lubrizol v. Imperial Oil involved patent claims 
to certain heavy molecular weight dispersants in automotive lubricating oils. This 
required such esoteric exercises as comparing number average molecular weights 
with weight average molecular weights o f certain components. The scientific 
concepts and definitions were not contested, only their application. It would have 
been desirable, I think, to have locked the judges alone in a room with a couple of 
experts appointed and paid for by the parties, to go over the common ground 
informally. In that setting, the judges could have engaged themselves in an open 
discussion and asked questions that no doubt they would have hesitated to ask in 
court, where judges are expected to sit Madame Tussaud-like listening passively to
61 “Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenge of Scientific Evidence” (1994) 108 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1481 at 1586. See also Paul Michell & Renu Mandhane, “The Uncertain Duty of the Expert 
Witness” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 635 on the possibility of court-imposed codes of conduct for experts. 
In Australia and some other common law jurisdictions, there is a move towards emphasizing the duty 
of an expert to provide the court with complete, objective and non-partisan information; to this end, 
some courts have developed guidelines and codes of conduct that must be signed by the expert. In the 
U.S., the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association have 
professional responsibilities and ethics explicitly incorporated in their respective Codes of Conduct for 
members involved in litigation. See also United Kingdon, Civil Procedure Rules r. 35.7; Australia, 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (N.S.W.) Sch. 7, r. 31.23 and r. 31.30; Australia, Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r. 426; and New Zealand, High Court Rules (N.Z.) r. 330A. See generally 
Bubela, ibid. at para. 28; and Peter Wardle & Danny Cappe, “Reforming Ontario’s Expert Evidence 
Rules” (Paper presented to Into the Future: The Agenda for Civil Justice Reform, April 2006), online: 
Canadian Forum on Civil Justice <http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/IntoTheFuture- 
VersLeFutur/advocatesPapers.htm>.
62 Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoescht Marion Roussel Ltd., [2005] 1 All E.R. 667.
what they are being told, often without knowing where the common ground ends and 
the controversy begins.
Prior to a trial, better use could also be made of case management.63 A judge 
who is assigned early in a “science” case to deal with all interlocutory issues may 
acquire a decent understanding over time of the underlying science. This may also 
provide an early springboard to discuss issues about presentation of technical 
evidence at trial. At present, in many Canadian jurisdictions, interlocutory matters in 
the same case may be assigned to different judges according to the vagaries of the 
judicial calendar, and the trial judge may have no prior exposure to the issues until 
the case opens. Judging from the reaction of Muldoon J. in the BOUNCE case, that 
initial dévoilement can be an appalling experience for everyone concerned.
Once the hearing begins, consideration might be given to a court-appointed 
expert nominated by the parties to sit with the judge or jurors to respond to their 
questions within the relevant field of expertise. In some cases, it may be appropriate 
for the court to take the initiative in appointing its own scientific amicus curiae to 
provide assistance in evaluating the scientific evidence, even without the consent of 
the parties.64 This is the tradition in some continental legal systems, and is the 
practice in British admiralty courts65 (which have a civil law genesis) as well as our
63 For example, a case management judge could impose trial segmentation to separate causation, liability 
and damages phases. This might help address problems caused by technological inexperience of the 
decision-makers. It would also limit the number o f issues that a judge or jury must consider in a single 
phase of the trial. The downside is that it may also result in a measure of duplication and repetition.
64 See e.g. Federal Rule 706 in the United States and Order 34 of the Australian Federal Court Rules, 
Statutory Rules 1979 No. 140 made under the Federal Court o f  Australia Act 1976, which provides:
2. Appointment
(1) If a question for an expert witness arises in a proceeding, the Court may, at any 
stage of the proceeding:
(a) appoint an expert as court expert to inquire into and report upon the question;
(b) authorize the court expert to inquire into and report upon any facts relevant to 
the inquiry and report on the question;
(c) direct the court expert to make a further or supplemental report or inquiry and 
report; and
(d) give such instructions as the court thinks fit relating to any inquiry or report of 
the court expert.
(3) Instructions pursuant to paragraph (l)(d) may include provision concerning any 
experiment or test for the purposes of any inquiry or report o f a court expert.
65 See e.g. The “British Resource” (1942), 73 LI. L. Rep. 143 (H.L.) at 144-45:
One could understand the difficulty of a layman appreciating that on a dark night 
ships could be seen at a distance sufficiently great to enable [the collision] to be 
avoided. Therefore it was particularly a matter for expert opinion, and in this case 
our nautical assessors had advised that the ships should have seen each other.
own Federal Court sitting in admiralty.66 Care must be taken, of course, to ensure 
that the litigants are not ambushed by the advice given by the assessors and that the 
principles of natural justice are observed: see Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros 
Gerais v. Be lean S. A.67 In England, there is a Rule of Practice permitting the Court 
of Appeal to appoint its own scientific advisor in a patent appeal.68
As to the expert evidence presented by the parties, the rules of procedure should 
be modified to require experts to exchange reports and meet face-to-face for an 
unmediated discussion before trial. Evidence of the results of scientific experiments 
done specifically for the trial should be excluded unless witnessed by the other side. 
The court should be able to order opposing experts to produce a joint report which 
defines key terms as well as the points of agreement and disagreement. Moreover, 
the court should be able to require opposing experts to testify on the same panel and 
be subject to questioning in the presence of each other, with the right to question 
each other in the presence of the trier of fact. The procedure whereby opposing 
experts testify together on the same panel is regularly used in continental legal 
systems as well as by administrative agencies in Canada, such as the National Energy 
Board, and is employed with success in the Federal Court of Australia (where it is 
known as the “Australian hot pot”).69 Experts testifying in the presence of one 
another are likely to be more measured and complete in their pronouncements, 
knowing that exaggeration or errors will be pounced upon instantly by a learned 
colleague, as opposed to being argued about days later, perhaps by unlearned 
opposing counsel.
Finally, the parties to these complex cases have a legitimate expectation that the 
reasons for judgment (where the case is tried without a jury) will make it clear the 
judge has heard and understood the technical aspects of the case. While in Canada, 
jurors cannot be asked about their deliberations (therefore no “wah wah wah”), a 
case heard by a judge alone should result in a decision that traces the judge’s 
pathway through the scientific evidence to the result. In this way, the trial judge 
establishes a better record for review by the appeal court, and provides assurance to 
the parties as well as the broader public that the issues have been properly addressed.
66 Federal Court o f  Canada Rules, S.O.R./98-106, Rule 56, “Role of Assessor”.
67 Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros Gerais v. Belcan S.A., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1278 at para. 40, 
McLachlin J.:
I conclude that the old admiralty rule appointing assessors to assist the judge in 
making findings o f fault to the exclusion o f expert evidence should be revised.
First, assessors should be permitted to assist judges in understanding technical 
evidence. Second, assessors may go further and advise the judge on matters o f fact 
in dispute between the parties, but only on condition of disclosure and a right of 
response sufficient to comply with the requirements of natural justice.
68 See Supreme Court Act 1981 (U.K.), ss. 54, 76, and Civil Procedure Rules r. 35.15. See also 
Halliburton Energy Services Inc. v. Smith International (North Sea) Ltd., [2006] EWCA Civ. 1599 
(Eng. C.A.), citing in part the Porto Seguro decision from our Supreme Court (at paras. 18-20).
69 See Rule 3 of Order 34A of the Australian Federal Court Rules.
Appeal courts should be prepared to consider rejection of boilerplate reasons from a 
trial judge that fail to come to grips with the scientific debate underlying the issues 
being litigated.70
CONCLUSION
Despite the conciliatory (if somewhat superior) tone adopted by the English judge 
| over four hundred and fifty years ago (“we do not despise all other sciences but our 
I own, but we approve of them and encourage them...”71), it must be said that judicial 
progress in matching reality to these fine words has been slow. Our courts may 
approve and encourage other sciences, but the real question is whether or not we 
adequately understand the science; and if not, are we doing enough to make our 
courts more “science friendly”? Procedures designed to deal with garden variety 
legal disputes have often been found inadequate, if not actually counter-productive, 
with respect to cases involving science and technology. The legitimacy o f a court’s 
judgment in such cases is tied to the rigour of its fact-finding and the ability of the 
judge or juror to evaluate the expertise involved. Reforms have been implemented, 
but more needs to be done if we are to be ready when Schroedinger’s cat arrives on 
the courthouse steps.
70 This approach is consistent with what the Supreme Court has set out in R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
869 and R. v. Braich, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903, for determining the adequacy of reasons for appellate 
review. The principle is that the reasons must be sufficient for an appellate court to determine the 
correctness o f the trial decision.
71 Buckley, supra note 1.
